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ACRONYMS
ATC Air Traffic Control
B-RNAV Basic Area Navigation
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CAT 1 Precision approach with
specified performance
EGNOS European Geostationary
Navigation Overlay Service
ESA European Space Agency
ESTEC ESA Technology Centre
ETG European Tripartite Group
EU European Union
EUROCAE European Organisation for
Civil Aviation Equipment
FTE Flight Technical Error
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite
System (Russian)
GMV Grupo de Mecánica del
Vuelo
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite
System
GPS Global Positioning System
GPV GNSS Performance
Validation study
H/W Hardware
ICAO International Civil Aviation
Organisation
ICD Interface Control Document
IGS International GPS Service
INS Inertial Navigation System
MOPS Minimum Operational
Performances
MRD Mission Requirements
Document
NLR National Aerospace
Laboratory
NSE Navigation System Error
R&D Research and Development
RAIM Receiver Autonomous
Integrity Monitoring
RNP Required Navigation
Performance
RTCA Radio Technical
Commission for
Aeronautics
SA Selective Availability
SARPs Standards and
Recommended Practices
SBAS Satellite Based
Augmentation System
SIS Signal In Space
SPS Standard Positioning
Service
SRD System Requirements
Document
TSP Total System Performance
WAAS Wide Area Augmentation
System
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ABSTRACT
The GNSS Performance Validation (GPV)
study has analysed the operational
validation of the GNSS-1 concept from an
aeronautical user point of view. The Total
System Performance (TSP) has been
divided into three topics: the Signal-in-
Space (SIS), the onboard equipment and the
dynamic system performance. This paper
highlights the main findings of this study
with regard to measurement, simulation and
analysis of performances necessary for a
legitimate operational validation. Secondly,
this paper addresses the configuration
options for a simulation environment which
are required for particular validation tests.
BACKGROUND
The first implementation phase of Global
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) in
Europe, called GNSS-1 (see Figure 1)
consists of three main elements: the Global
Positioning System (GPS), the Global
Orbiting Navigation Satellite System
(GLONASS) and regional Satellite Based
Augmentation Systems (SBAS). The
European Geostationary Navigation
Overlay Service (EGNOS) is the SBAS
covering the European region.
The European Tripartite Group (ETG) of
the European Union (EU), the European
Space Agency (ESA) and the European
Organisation for the Safety of Air
Navigation (EUROCONTROL) are
managing the development of EGNOS.
Within the ETG, EUROCONTROL is
responsible for the operational validation of
EGNOS.
The GNSS Performance Validation (GPV)
study was performed under the authority of
EUROCONTROL in order to assess all the
aspects related to the operational validation
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of the GNSS-1 concept. EUROCONTROL
has now undertaken to set up the
operational validation programme on the
basis of the results of this study.
GPS
GLONASS Geo
Monitoring network
Master
Control
Center
Figure 1: GNSS-1 system architecture
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years substantial progress has
been made towards the implementation of
GNSS in European airspace. In this
process, the following issues are being
addressed:
• definition of operational requirements
for GNSS-based navigation systems;
• validation of standards intended to
support these requirements;
• validation of the performance of the
total aircraft system with respect to the
GNSS standards and the airspace
requirements;
• definition of operational procedures for
aircraft utilizing GNSS.
Although GPS has already been approved
for use as a means of basic area navigation
(B-RNAV), its use is limited. The
introduction of a first generation GNSS
through space-based, airborne, and possibly
ground-based augmentation will provide a
substantial increase in the capabilities of
systems based on GPS and GLONASS
thereby permitting users to obtain benefits
from GNSS in all phases of flight down to
CAT I precision approach.
To allow the introduction of GNSS for
these different operations in European
airspace, a clear link needs to be established
between the requirements set by the use of
this airspace, and the Signal-in-Space and
receiver specifications available for GPS,
GLONASS and its augmentations. Airspace
requirements on total aircraft performance
are laid down in the manuals for Required
Navigation Performance (RNP) of the
International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO); the GNSS Signal-in-Space
requirements are currently being drafted by
ICAO’s GNSS Panel; while RTCA and
EUROCAE are finalising the receiver
requirements.
2 RNP PARAMETER
DEFINITIONS
The basis of a validation effort is
determined by the RNP parameters
accuracy, integrity, continuity-of-service
and availability. Unfortunately, several
bodies - [GPS-SPS, 1995], [GLONASS-
ICD, 1995], [ICAO SARPs, 1998],
[RTCA/DO-229] - use different definitions
of these parameters and their relation.
For example, the relation between the
different RNP parameters in the GPS-SPS
is specified the other way round compared
to the ICAO documents. In the SARPs, the
accuracy, or rather the horizontal and
vertical alert limits, are used as baseline
parameters, and thereafter the integrity and
continuity risks are conditioned on these.
On the other hand, in the GPS-SPS the
accuracy of the Signal-in-Space is only
determined once the signal is available and
its integrity has been established. In
-6-
NLR-TP-99420
[Farnworth, 1998] some of these
differences are illustrated for accuracy.
[EUROCONTROL, 1998] proposed a set of
definitions, which has become applicable
for the GNSS-1 mission requirements.
Therefore these will form the basis for the
validation of GNSS.
3 VALIDATION METHODS
Validation methods include analysis,
modelling, simulation, static data collection
and in-flight data collection.
In general, data collection is the preferred
method, since insufficient theoretical
information is available to validate all
parameters. Unfortunately, an immense
amount of data will be required for full
validation of the values of the integrity and
continuity parameters. Therefore, data
needs to be extrapolated in time as well as
in space, based on required confidence
levels. In addition, the collected data needs
to be combined with available system
knowledge to validate simulation models
that can be used for statistical analysis.
For the different RNP parameters the
required amount of samples and the
sampling rate is determined. The sample
rate is limited due to the fact that
uncorrelated samples are required, while
the amount of data to be collected depends
on specific confidence levels. When models
of the spatial and/or temporal behaviour of
the data have been derived they can be
extrapolated to minimise the effort needed
for data collection.
Once models can be validated using
collected data, simulation is essential for
further system development and evaluating
various operational scenarios.
4 GNSS PERFORMANCE
BREAKDOWN
Approval of using GNSS-1 within the
European airspace, a test and validation
programme will need to demonstrate that an
aircraft,
1. receiving GPS and/or GLONASS
signals-in-space conforms to [GPS-
SPS, 1995] and [GLONASS-ICD,
1995],
2. using EGNOS, RAIM or other
augmentations, meets the SIS
performance requirements,
3. is equipped with a receiver conforming
to the Minimum Operational
Performance Specifications (MOPS)
[RTCA DO-229],
4. is able to meet the airspace
requirements applicable for that phase
of flight.
The basis of validation activities comprises
the SIS and receiver performance
specifications as developed by ICAO and
RTCA/ EUROCAE. Validating the Signal-
in-Space and the receiver to conform to
these standards should ensure that an
aircraft using compliant equipment is
capable of meeting the operational
requirements of the total aircraft system,
see Figure 2. The proposed methodology
for the GNSS performance validation
process is described in [EUROCONTROL,
1999].
SIS Receiver
Other
Sensors
Nav.
System Total 
System
Aircraft
GNSS
Figure 2: System components of GNSS
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The first stage in the validation process is
to ensure that the GNSS performance
standards represent the European airspace
requirements. This would include validation
of the ICAO SARPs as well as Mission
Requirements Documents (MRD)
describing Europe’s additional
requirements.
The second stage is validating the
performance of space-based signals, i.e.
GPS, GLONASS and EGNOS, with respect
to sections of the ICAO SARPs containing
information extracted from GPS and
GLONASS ICD documents and EGNOS
and WAAS specifications.
The third stage is validating the
performance of the receiver - either stand-
alone or integrated with other sensors - with
respect to the receiver standards (i.e.
RTCA, MOPS).
The fourth stage is to validate whether the
performance of the fully equipped aircraft
using the proper signals-in-space is able to
meet the requirements set for the airspace in
which it is operating.
These validation activities will serve as a
basis for certification of the ground, space
and airborne equipment. This methodology
should provide the European safety
regulatory bodies with a framework
allowing the validation of GNSS-based
systems consisting of many widely
dispersed elements which are operated and
controlled outside national borders.
5 VALIDATION OF GNSS
PERFORMANCE
5.1 Validation of the Signal-in-Space
In the near future, the received satellite
signals-in-space which are part of a GNSS
configuration (as shown in Figure 1), are
composed of GPS, GLONASS and SBAS
(i.e. EGNOS for the European region).
Validation of the GPS and GLONASS SIS
will need to focus on collecting statistical
evidence of the behaviour of GPS and
GLONASS, as detailed system
specifications are not available for these
systems. However, a large amount of SIS
performance data is already available for
these systems which have been operational,
for quite some time.
For EGNOS, a specific SIS specification
has been developed [EGNOS-SRD, 1998].
As a result, a more specific validation
programme can be set up to check whether
the system performance meets its
specifications and is the responsibility of
the developer of EGNOS, i.e. the European
Space Agency (ESA). However, the
European civil aviation community plays an
active role in all the design reviews and
system safety assessments.
When validating the performance of the
SIS, the focus will have to be on those
elements that determine the accuracy of the
individual range and range rate
measurements to the GPS, GLONASS and
geostationary satellites. This can only be
accomplished while using a receiver.
Therefore, the range accuracy is determined
by two main factors: the satellite and the
user.
The main satellite signal-in-space
parameters are clock and ephemeris data.
Both may be subject to unintentional and
intentional degradation. Unintentional
degradation of the clock is due to the
instability of the on-board frequency
standard, while ephemeris errors are caused
by incorrect ephemeris prediction and
model implementation, which could result
from e.g. space vehicle acceleration
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uncertainty. Intentional degradation of the
SIS, called Selective Availability, is
currently only applied to the GPS satellite
clocks, however it may be phased out in the
near future.
User errors can be divided into the inability
to model the signal group delays in the
ionosphere and troposphere, multi-path and
receiver noise which strictly speaking are
not elements of the SIS).
It is very difficult to distinguish between
SIS and receiver performance. It should be
taken into account that when measuring SIS
performance one will always include
receiver induced errors.
Accuracy validation will require data
collection over an interval resulting in
statistics representative of any time and
location in the coverage area. The GPS
SARPs specify a data collection period of at
least 4-hours during a 24 hour period. On
the other hand, no requirements currently
exist for GLONASS. Unfortunately, the
data collected over such a period will prove
to be not very useful as most data will be
highly correlated and the 4-hour averages
will differ substantially on a day-to-day
basis. The current rule-of-thumb for GPS is
a 200-second correlation interval for
Selective Availability. Data already
collected [GPV3100, 1998] confirm that
this is the right order of magnitude. Data
collected for GLONASS (which does not
employ SA) indicate a correlation interval
of 600 seconds for the ionospheric errors on
the range measurements.
Validation of integrity and availability
statistics based on data collection is
difficult due to the rarity of outages and
integrity failures. Long term ground and in-
flight data collection efforts will, therefore,
be necessary. Ground data are already being
collected in the IGS network, although only
for GPS. In-flight data collection has
already started in the SAPPHIRE project
[Tiemeyer et al., 1998].
As mentioned before, the GNSS SIS
specification is based on the fault-free
receiver concept. Therefore, to validate the
GNSS SIS against SARP requirements,
multiple receivers will have to be used in
order to isolate specific receiver-dependent
failures from the measurements. In
addition, the results will have to be
calibrated for the nominal accuracy and
time-to-alarm budgets.
When considering SIS performance of a
single satellite, the continuity-of-service
parameter is of little relevance, as it
basically is a service parameter related to
specific aircraft operations.
5.2 Validation of receiver performance
RTCA and EUROCAE provide detailed
testing procedures for validating receiver
performance, e.g. [RTCA/DO-229].
General receiver tests are specified as well
as tests for receivers intended for specific
phases of flight, in particular the approach
phase. The general receiver performance
tests include:
• (Re)-Acquisition,
• Satellite selection,
• Signal processing,
• Message processing,
• Receiver integrity.
Specific receiver tests are related to
integrity monitoring during precision
approaches.
A detailed assessment of these tests showed
that these tests alone would not be
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sufficient for a proper validation of the
receiver performance. Especially for multi-
path and integrated architectures additional
tests are required, and have been proposed
[EUROCONTROL, 1999].
Integrating 2 or 3 uncoupled GNSS/INS
elements is recommended following a fault
tree assessment of different integration
options. This integration option is preferred
both with regard to performance and level
of complexity.
5.3 Validation of total system
performance
After the assessment of the GNSS
navigation system error (NSE), the total
system error (TSE) needs to be validated to
include the aircraft performance based on
GNSS signals. The flight technical error
(FTE) will be influenced by the behaviour
of the NSE which has to be carefully
analysed in order to be able to validate the
Total System Performance (TSP).
Due to the high costs of an extensive flight
test program, simulations need to be
performed to the maximum extent. The
models used for the simulation must,
however, be validated by means of static
and in-flight data collection.
Flight trials are effective to validate the
available software models resulting in an
overall system performance evaluation on a
temporal as well as a spatial basis. An
exhaustive validation of all potential
scenarios each with probable parameter
combinations using flight trials would be
impractical. If the different contributions to
the performance are conveniently identified
and modelled, the flight trials will serve to
validate the correctness of those models and
to determine the safety margins which must
be applied to guarantee specific service
performance with system performance
models.
6 SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
FOR VALIDATION
The previous sections indicate that merely
real measurements would not suffice or be
far too expensive for the operational
validation of the GNSS-1 concept.
Simulations are essential to reduce the time
required for validation, to cover special
“worst-case” conditions and to reduce the
cost of an operational validation campaign.
Therefore, dedicated simulation
environments should be established
specifically for these tasks. Three different
levels of simulation environments have
been proposed.
6.1 Receiver validation environment
This would require a set-up including a
GNSS signal generator, constellation and
aircraft dynamic models to provide inputs
for a physical  receiver. Figure 3 depicts the
environment. Aspects relating to
acquisition, tracking, interference and
multi-path could be covered within this
environment.
Monitoring & Control
Software
Simulator
GNSS Simulator
GNSS
Constellation
Aircraft
Dynamics
Sensor 
Models
Navigation
Filter
GNSS
Receiver
Signal
generator
Figure 3: Receiver validation environment
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6.2 TSP validation environment
The TSP environment requires a closed
loop in which the navigation output is fed
back through a guidance module into the
aircraft dynamics models which in turn
provides the input for the signal generator.
Figure 4 illustrates the set-up.
For this set-up the receiver validation
environment (i.e. physical receiver in the
loop) could be augmented by a guidance
model or even a complete flight simulator
to incorporate the human factor. However,
some dedicated fast-time simulations
require an all-software simulator.
 Flight Simulator
Monitoring & Control
GNSS Simulator
Synchronisation
GNSS
Constellation
Sensor 
Models
Aircraft
Dynamics
Navigation
Filters
Auto-
pilot
Signal
Generator

	
Pilot
interface
Figure 4: TSP validation environment
6.3 Operational validation environment
The operational environment (Figure 5)
focuses on the aircraft’s surroundings (e.g.
multiple aircraft, ATC and special terminal
conditions). In this case the performance of
a physical receiver is less important.
Integrating a software module with a
coupled flight and ATC simulator to
determine the navigation performance is
likely to provide the best results.
One should bear in mind that the simulation
environments provide the most realistic
performance when as many H/W
components as possible are incorporated.
Software
Simulator
Monitoring & Control
Aircraft n
Dynamics
Aircraft 1
ATC  Simulator
Dynamics &
guidanceSensor Models
Navigation
Filters
Receiver
Model
GNSS
Constellation
Pilots
ATC
Figure 5: Operational  validation
7 CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions from the GPV study
are as follows:
 SIS validation can be based mainly on
real measurements. Failure analysis and
simulation tools are required to cover
special conditions,
 Available receiver tests (i.e. MOPS) are
not sufficient, especially with regard to
multi-path and integrated receivers.
Additional tests have been proposed,
 Receiver, TSP and operational
validation require extensive simulation.
Simulation environments have been
proposed,
 Simulation environments present the
additional complication of validating
the models,
 Flight trials should support model
validation and should always be
considered as the ultimate proof.
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